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Abstract
First, we demonstrate how unregulated price setting in mobile
telecommunications may lead to monopolization, even when networks
are highly substitutable. Second, we demonstrate that a menu of
structural rules, including (i) mandatory interconnection, (ii) recip-
rocal access prices and (iii) a ban on price discrimination of calls to
other networks may restore competition. This regulation requires nei-
ther demand data nor information about call costs.
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1 Introduction
The European mobile telecommunications sector is currently under dual reg-
ulation.1 Various structural regulations increase competition between mo-
bile networks, by reducing di¤erentiation and consumer switching costs.
Extensive coverage obligations make the networks overlap geographically.
Mandatory interconnection make it possible to make calls between networks.
Number-portability allow consumers who want to switch networks to retain
their phone number. Remaining network di¤erentiation results mainly from
tari¤ constructions and the creation of consumer switching costs, which can
also be reduced by regulatory intervention.
At the same time, the sector is still under price regulation. The fees
charged for terminating calls from one network to another must typically
be cost-based. The problems of price regulation are well-documented. A
recent o¢ cial report describes excessive bureaucratic complications (SOU,
2006). Companies and regulators often have divergent views of most issues,
from the competitive situation to the level of cost, and the decisions are
usually appealed. Legal proceedings are known to drag on for years. In
addition, companies have great di¢ culties in predicting the eventual decisions
by regulatory agencies and courts.
We analyze whether further reductions of network di¤erentiation and
switching costs would be enough to create a competitive environment al-
lowing the price regulations to be removed. In case competition would still
be imperfect, we like to know if there are additional structural remedies that
may be added to restore competition.
1The European regulations are laid down in the Framework Directive and the Ac-
cess and Interconnection Directive. The Access Directive provides a menu of possible
remedies for the interconnection markets, including mandatory access, price control, non-
discrimination and transparency.
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Limits to Competition First, we demonstrate why and how unregulated
price setting may lead to monopolization even when networks are highly
substitutable. Entry is deterred by imposing three margin squeezes. First,
the access price charged by the monopolist for termination is so high in
relation to the price the monopolist charges for calls inside its own network
(on-net) that it is impossible for an entrant to compete on termination of calls
in the monopolists network. Second, the monopolist sets a price for calls to
any entrant (o¤-net) which is so low that the entrant cannot even prot from
termination of calls in its own network. Third, the monopolist pays so little
for call termination in the entrants network that the entrant earns no access
revenues. To successfully monopolize the market when networks are close
substitutes, a monopolist must squeeze the entrants in all three markets.
The risk of monopolization hinges crucially, however, on asymmetric bar-
gaining power between the networks, or a mechanism for the monopolist to
share its prots with an entrant. A prudent regulator will probably ask for
additional tools to reduce the danger of monopolization .
A Simple Regulation Solves the Problem Second, we demonstrate
that a menu of structural rules is su¢ cient to restore competition when net-
works are perfect substitutes. The menu include (i) mandatory intercon-
nection; (ii) reciprocal access prices and (iii) a ban on price discrimination
between on-net calls and o¤-net calls. Policies (i) and (iii) intensify call
price competition by eliminating network externalities. Policy (ii) ensures
that one rm cannot push the competitor out of the market by underpricing
access.
The policies are informationally undemanding: no information is required
about demand or the costs of completing calls. They are thus easy to imple-
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ment and should also be transparent to the industry, thereby reducing the
often substantial costs of regulation.
Mandatory interconnection and reciprocal access prices are standard ele-
ments in the regulators toolbox. A ban on call price discrimination is novel,
but consistent with e.g. EU regulations. In Estonia, for instance, the incum-
bent is disallowed to price discriminate between on-net and o¤-net prices of
xed calls (ERG, 2007).
Finally, it is well-known that an equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e. stable
call prices, may fail to exist in telecom markets. We consider the problem
of non-existence as real, not as an artefact of the model. We assume that
regulators prefer stable prices. We will demonstrate that the policy sketched
above guarantees the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Other policies
(discussed below) do not.
Other Common Policies may Fail Finally, we also analyze the prop-
erties of a number of common regulatory policies. A simple prohibition of
margin squeezes inside ones own network may be counter-productive. Im-
plementing such a policy may lead to a softening of competition by establish-
ing a credible oor on on-net prices instead of the intended ceiling on access
prices.
A ban onmargin squeezes on termination of calls in the entrants network,
would break the incumbent´s monopoly power, but would require informa-
tion about the cost of calls in addition to being ine¢ cient: calls would be
priced above marginal cost.
Requiring a reciprocal access price above the marginal termination cost
will induce competitive prices even without the additional call price regu-
lation. However, the e¢ ciency of this policy may be limited by arbitrage.
4
If the access price happens to be too high in relation to the competitive
price, each network could open a subscription in the competitors network
and prot from making an unbounded number of o¤-net calls to ones own
network. Competition would be non-viable. In the presence of arbitrage, the
informational requirements of this policy are substantial.
Contributions We extend the analysis of network competition to the case
of strong network externalities by assuming a low (zero) degree of network
di¤erentiation. Most papers in the literature have followed in the footstep
of Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a and b), henceforth
LRT, by assuming a very high degree of network di¤erentiation. Exceptions
are Doganoglu and Tauman (2002), Jeon and Hurkens (2008) and Stennek
and Tangerås (2008), all of whom start from the premise that networks are
interconnected, access prices are reciprocal and call price discrimination is
illegal. The present paper makes no such restrictions, but presents a rationale
for why these three policies might form the basis of a sound regulatory policy
and, therefore, a rational for the modelling strategy.
Most of the literature concerned with market performance considers the
problem of collusive access prices. Instead, Calzada and Valletti (2008)
study how reciprocal access prices can be used to deter entry when net-
works are poor substitutes. The present paper complements Calzada and
Valletti (2008) by showing that entry deterrence can be achieved even when
networks are close substitutes, provided the access prices are asymmetric.
We show that networks may have an incentive not to interconnect be-
cause subsequent cut-throat competition will eradicate all prots. Carter
and Wright (1999) also study the incentives to connect, but conclude that
the problem is anti-competitive agreements, rather than reaching an agree-
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ment. Their conclusion which is based on a model of di¤erentiated networks.
This shows that the degree of network di¤erentiation is likely to be important
for the networksincentives to connect.
Discussion of the Assumptions The market for telecommunications
clearly is a lot more complicated than the model we consider. We have
ignored xed telephony as we expect mobile telephony to become the dom-
inating medium for voice telephony. Mobile penetration exceeds 100% in
many developed countries, the UK and Sweden being two examples. Mobile
telephony is superior to xed telephony in many dimensions, not only regard-
ing mobility, but also in terms of available services, such as text messaging
and multimedia access. With mobile prices converging to xed prices, more
and more subscribers can be expected to abandon xed telephony altogether.
Twenty-six out of thirty OECD countries have three or more national
operators. Moreover, switching between networks is costly due to lead times.
Our assumptions of duopoly and perfect network substitutability seem at
odds with reality, but are not critical. We show in the Appendix that
monopoly call prices can be sustained in duopoly even in a standard Hotelling
model of network di¤erentiation, provided networks are not too di¤erenti-
ated. Obviously, a deregulated market can be monopolized independently of
the number of networks, provided all challengers accept the same unfavorable
asymmetric call termination conditions.
In a companion paper (Stennek and Tangerås, 2008), we extend the analy-
sis to cover the case of many networks and imperfect network substitutability.
It turns out that the market can be monopolized even if the networks are re-
quired to charge reciprocal access prices and are forbidden to create network
externalities by means of di¤erentiating call prices or making the networks
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incompatible. The problem now is collusion, rather than entry deterrence.
Market concentration has two countervailing e¤ects on network competition.
A standard competitive e¤ect working through the elasticity of demand pulls
in favour of low prices. But a cost e¤ect goes in the other direction. A larger
fraction of each networks calls are terminated o¤-net when there are more
networks. If o¤-net calls are subjected to an access price mark-up, the e¤ec-
tive marginal call cost goes up when there are more networks. If the access
price is high enough, the cost e¤ect is so strong as to fully neutralize the com-
petitive e¤ect, leaving equilibrium prices unchanged at the monopoly level.
To restore competition, we add a cost-independent cap on access prices to
the regulatory menu (i)-(iii). For a su¢ ciently tight cap, call prices fall as
more networks enter the market and converge to marginal cost as network
di¤erentiation goes to zero.
Typically, telecom operators have large xed costs. Fixed costs would
only serve to exacerbate the problem of monopolization under a laissez-faire
policy. However, the networks are unable to recover their xed costs under
competitive prices. Therefore, some lump-sum transfers might be required
to secure budget balance. Information about xed costs may be more readily
available than information about marginal call costs. Moreover, it is not so-
cially optimal to strive for "perfect competition", for example by removing all
network di¤erentiation. We leave the issue of optimal network di¤erentiation
for future research.
We make the assumption that networks use linear prices, but show else-
where (available upon request) that our main results do not hinge upon this
assumption. The industry may be monopolized also under two-part call
tari¤s, and any equilibrium by necessity is competitive under the menu of
regulatory policies (i)-(iii). We believe that an analysis with linear prices is
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interesting in its own right. Standard models of nonlinear network compe-
tition seem unable to capture interesting economic trade-o¤s and important
ine¢ ciencies. In the standard models there are no consumer losses due to
distortions. All calls are priced at marginal cost. Marginal costs are too low
since the networks tend to agree on access prices below the marginal cost
of termination (Gans and King, 2001; Calzada and Valletti, 2008). In addi-
tion to producing counter-factual predictions - o¤-net prices are below on-net
prices - call prices are too low from a welfare viewpoint. Most regulators are
concerned with call prices being too high. In reality, operators o¤er menus
of two-part tari¤s, presumably to price discriminate between heterogeneous
consumers. Under non-linear prices, operators would distort call prices to ex-
tract rent from subscribers, precisely as in a model without two-part tari¤s.
Thus, a model with homogeneous consumers which abstracts from two-part
tari¤s captures the same ine¢ ciencies and trade-o¤s one would expect to ma-
terialize in a more elaborate (and complicated) model with two-part tari¤s
and heterogeneous consumers (see Dessein, 2003 for an early exploration).
2 Model
Consider a mobile telecom market with 2 operators/networks. The interac-
tion is described as a game with four stages. First, the operators negotiate
access prices. Subsequently, the operators unilaterally and simultaneously
set the prices for calls inside their network, so-called on-net calls, and calls
outside the network, so-called o¤-net calls. Third, the consumers choose a
subscription based on the call prices, and nally decide how many calls to
make. There is a continuum of consumers of unit measure, each of whom
buys one subscription, i.e. the market is fully covered.
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Call Demand In stage four, all consumers have taken a subscription in
one of the networks, and they all make calls on the basis of the call prices.
Every subscriber to network i makes qii calls to every subscriber in network
i at the on-net price pii per call and qij calls to every subscriber in the other
network j, at the o¤-net price pij per call. No subscriber attaches any value to
incoming calls and therefore receives utility siU (qii)+(1 si)U (qij)+y, where
si 2 [0; 1] is the customer base of operator i, U () is a twice di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function, and y is a numeraire
good. Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint siqiipii + (1  
si)qijpij + y  I yields demand qii = D (pii) and qij = D (pij), where D is
the inverse of U 0, and I denotes income. We assume that D (0) is nite and
that limp!1D (p) = 0.
Network Subscriptions In stage three, consumers choose a network on
the basis of the operatorsannounced end-user prices. Let u (p) = U (D (p)) 
D (p) p be the indirect call utility and assume that limp!1 u (p) = 0. The
indirect utility (net of income) of belonging to network i, then, is
V (pi; si) = siu (pii) + (1  si)u (pij) , (1)
where pi = (pii; pij) is the call price prole of operator i. Let p = (p1; p2) be
the vector of call prices.
Since all subscribers choose network simultaneously, customer bases are
not observable when the choice of network is made. Instead, the network is
chosen on the basis of the expected utility of belonging to di¤erent networks,
i.e. on the basis of call prices and expected customer bases. In rational
expectations equilibrium, however, expected and real customer bases are the
same.
By assumption, networks are perfect substitutes. Consequently, network
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i has a positive customer base only if V (pi; si)  V (pj; sj). If consumers
are indi¤erent between both networks independently of customer bases, we
assume the operators to share customers equally.2
With perfect network substitutability there are multiple equilibria in cus-
tomer bases for some combinations of call prices. In particular, if u (pii) >
u (pji) and u (pij) < u (pjj), there are two extreme equilibria with either rm
monopolizing the market and one interior equilibrium with positive market
shares for both networks. The interior equilibrium is unstable, however. If
just a small fraction of customers happened to switched network, it would
be better for the rest of the customers to follow, as a result of positive net-
work externalities. The process would not stop until one of the asymmetric
equilibria is reached (cf. Tirole, 1988). The following Lemma describes the
stable equilibria in customer bases.
Lemma 1 The stable customer base of operator i is given by
Si(p) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1 if u (pii)  [>]u (pji) and u (pij) > []u (pjj)
1=2 if u (pii) = u (pji) and u (pij) = u (pjj)
0 if u (pii)  [<]u (pji) and u (pij) < []u (pjj)
1 and 0 if u (pii) > u (pji) and u (pij) < u (pjj)
u(pij) u(pjj)
u(pij)+u(pji) u(pii) u(pjj) if u(pii) < u(pji) and u (pij) > u (pjj)
The proof of the above and all subsequent lemmas and propositions are
contained in the Appendix.
In the three rst cases, the prices are such that there are no network
e¤ects: one customers preferred network does not depend on the choices of
2In reality, all di¤erentiation could probably not be removed, nor would it be socially
optimal to do so. In Section 4 we check the implications of variations in network di¤eren-
tiation on our main results.
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other customers. All customers have the same preferences; thus, they all end
up with the same operator. An exception is when the two operators o¤er the
same benets, in which case the operators share the market equally. In the
fourth case, the prices induce positive network externalities, and the networks
become strategic complements: all customers prefer to belong to the network
with the largest customer base. In stable equilibrium, all customers belong
to the same network, but which one is undetermined. In the nal case, the
prices induce negative network externalities whereby the networks become
strategic substitutes. The larger is the customer base, the less attractive is
the network. In this case, the equilibrium customer bases balance the prices
to make the two networks equally attractive for customers.
Network Prot In stage two, network i sets (non-negative) call prices pi
to maximize its prot
i(pi) = Si [Si (pii   c)D (pii) + Sj (pij   ai   co)D (pij) + Sj (aj   ct)D (pji)] ,
(2)
where ct is the marginal cost of call termination, co is the marginal cost
of call origination, c = ct + co is the total marginal cost of a completed
call, ai is access price paid by network i for every call terminated in the
competitors network and aj is the compensation i receives for every outside
call it terminates in the own network. The term in brackets is the prot per
subscriber. The rst term is the prot from on-net calls, the second term
is the prot from outgoing o¤-net calls, and the third term is the prot on
incoming o¤-net calls.
To guarantee that the monopoly prot functionD (p) (p  c) has a unique
interior maximum, pm > c, we assume that (p   c) (p) =p is increasing in
p  c and that limp!1(p   c) (p) =p > 1, where  (p) =  pD0(p)=D(p)
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is the price elasticity of call demand. Common demand functions such as
constant elasticity an linear demand fulll these assumptions. Denote by
m = D (pm) (pm   c) the monopoly prot.
We consider Nash equilibria in pure strategy call prices, henceforth simply
referred to as equilibria. Equilibria are indicated by an asterisk, so that
pi = (p

ii; p

ij) is an equilibrium call price prole by operator i, p
 = (p1; p

2) is
a vector of equilibrium call prices, Si = Si(p
) is a corresponding equilibrium
customer base, and i = i(p

i ) denotes the equilibrium prot of network i.
In the rst stage, the networks negotiate the pair (a1,a2) of access prices.
As is standard in the literature, the access prices are set to maximize industry
prot 1 + 

2. To guarantee that a network will not have an incentive to
make phony calls to the other network, the marginal cost of o¤-net calls must
be non-negative, i.e. ai   co.
Equilibrium with positive network externalities Certain call prices
give rise to positive network externalities in the customerschoice of networks.
One network attracting all customers is then a stable equilibrium outcome,
but so is the other network attracting all customers. This happens if u (p11) >
u (p21) and u (p22) > u (p12).
Positive network externalities are unlikely to arise in equilibrium, how-
ever. In such a case, one operator could always change its call price to get the
same prot with certainty as it would at most obtain under positive network
externalities.
Lemma 2 Assume that for every price conguration which gives rise to pos-
itive network externalities, at least one operator assigns a positive subjective
probability to both stable customer base congurations Si(p) 2 f0; 1g. Then,
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there exists no equilibrium with positive network externalities.
On the basis of Lemma 2 we henceforth disregard equilibria with positive
network externalities.
Welfare Welfare is the sum of indirect consumer utility and rm prot:
W (p) = S1V (p1; S1) + S2V (p2; S2) + 1 + 2
= S21(U (D (p11))  cD (p11)) + S22(U (D (p22))  cD (p22))
+S1S2(U (D (p12))  cD (p12) + U (D (p21))  cD (p21)).
The social optimum is achieved by setting all prices equal to marginal cost
in this model. The access prices have only an indirect bearing on welfare via
the e¤ect on call prices and rm protability. The scope of regulation is to
induce a competitive equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium in which all calls
are made at marginal cost c.
3 Call Prices, Access Prices, Interconnection
3.1 Laissez-faire
Assume that operators are free to negotiate any access price between them-
selves, and that call prices are unregulated. A laissez-faire policy may lead
to monopoly pricing:
Proposition 1 If ai = ct and aj is su¢ ciently high (aj  a = ct + 2(pm  
c) + cD(0)=D(pm)), there exists an equilibrium. In any equilibrium, network
i corners the market (Si = 1), charges the monopoly price on on-net calls
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(pii = p
m) and sets a price on o¤-net calls below the marginal cost of on-net
calls (pij  c).
The proposition states that full monopolization is the unique equilibrium
outcome. Access prices block competition even when networks are perfect
substitutes and there are no xed costs.
Since network i monopolizes the market, i will sometimes be referred to
as the incumbent. Network j, then, is the entrant. The incumbents pricing
policy takes the form of a three so-called margin squeezes. First, the access
price for termination in the incumbents network is so high in relation to the
incumbents on-net price (aj > pii   co) that it is impossible for an entrant
to protably compete on termination of calls in the incumbents network.
Second, the incumbent sets an o¤-net call price that is so low that the entrant
cannot even prot from termination of calls in its own network (pij  c).
Third, the incumbents compensation to the competitor for call termination
is so low that the entrant earns no access revenues (ai = ct). To successfully
monopolize the market when the two networks are close substitutes, a rm
must squeeze the competitor in all three markets. For example, a failure to
squeeze the competitor in the competitors own network (pij > c), would
allow the competitor ample leeway to protably monopolize the market for
itself (pjj 2 (c; pij), pji < pm = pii). Importantly, this suggests an extension
of the margin squeeze criterion to include more markets than just termination
in the squeezers own network, the common policy today.
Full monopolization necessarily involves one of the operators cornering
the market. It is impossible for the two operators to share the market and
reach industry monopoly prots when the degree of network substitutabil-
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ity is very high.3 We see three plausible reasons why such an asymmetric
equilibrium may be a reasonable prediction. First, one of the networks may
have substantially more bargaining power, e.g. resulting from an incumency
advantage, starting out with all customers in the own network (cf. de Bijl
and Peitz, 2002). Second, if both operators are international carriers with
a home and a foreign market, they could agree on a geographical market
segmentation allowing each operator to monopolize its home market. Third,
prots can be distributed by means of joint ownership whereby each operator
holds a 50% stake in the competitor.
We conclude there is a scope for a prudent regulator to intervene. Given
the importance of margin squeezes, we consider rst regulation of call prices.
3.2 Regulation of Call Prices
Prohibition of Margin Squeezes in the Own Network Assume that
margin squeezes on the termination of calls inside ones own network are
illegal, i.e. network i (the incumbent) is required to set a combination of
on-net prices and access prices satisfying pii  aj + co. This policy requires
information about the cost of originating calls. But what is worse, a ban on
margin squeezes might actually lead to higher call prices. The problem is
that a ban on margin squeezes not only places a price ceiling on the access
prices, but also a price oor on on-net calls. This price oor might serve
to weaken competition. To illustrate this point we take advantage of the
following result:
3Monopoly prots would require monopoly prices in all market segments, i.e. on both
on-net and o¤-net calls. Such a pricing policy would lead to a division of the market and
division of the monopoly prot between the two operators. However, each operator could
easily corner the market by lowering its o¤-net price slightly below the monopoly level,
thereby capturing the entire monopoly prot for itself.
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Proposition 2 Assume that ai = ct and aj 2 [pm   co; a). Then, all equi-
libria have i cornering the market (Si = 1) charging at most the monopoly
price on on-net calls (pii  pm). There exists a p 2 (c; pm), such that all
on-net prices pii 2 (p; pm] can be sustained in equilibrium.
If, in laissez-faire, the monopolist is unable to raise the access price suf-
ciently (i.e. up to a), the threat of entry might push down the equilibrium
on-net price below the monopoly level, to say pii < p
m = aj+ co. With a ban
on margin squeezes, the price would never fall below the oor aj + co = pm.
In other words, a ban on margin squeezes may act as a commitment device,
ensuring a high on-net price.
Prohibition of Predatory Prices in the Other Network Assume now
that i is required to set pij > c. This policy may be described as a prohibition
of predatory pricing. Such a policy would be as demanding as the previous
one in terms on information about marginal cost, but would have the impact
that no operator could establish monopoly power; see the argument above.
Three aspects are noteworthy. First, the threshold is the competitors
marginal cost c = co + ct and not co + ai, which is operator is marginal cost
of sending calls to j. Second, the policy might lead to disturbances of call
prices in the sense that a pure strategy equilibrium in call prices may then fail
to exist. Moreover, the policy cannot possibly lead to the rst-best outcome
as it requires that o¤-net calls be priced above marginal cost c. Hence, better
policies than this could exist.
Prohibition of Call Price Discrimination Both policies above are bur-
dened with informational problems. A softer type of regulation than direct
price regulation would be to prohibit price-discrimination between on- and
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o¤-net calls, i.e. requiring pii = pij = pi. This policy requires no information
at all about cost data. Moreover:
Proposition 3 If call price discrimination is prohibited (pii = pij = pi), the
competitive outcome (p1 = p

2 = c) is the only possible equilibrium.
Uniform pricing forces rms into Bertrand competition with one another
for customers, which necessarily forces prices down to marginal cost. It would
appear that uniform pricing solves the monopoly problem. However, in the
proposed equilibrium, operator is prot is given by
i =
1
4
(aj   ai)D(c).
Unless operators charge reciprocal access prices, one operator will su¤er a
loss at marginal cost pricing. There is no reason to presume that the oper-
ators would actually agree on reciprocal access charges, as all prots would
subsequently be competed away. If interconnection is mandatory, e¢ cient
bargaining suggests that the operators prefer to induce exit, although there
is the issue of splitting the surplus from such an agreement. In case a pure
strategy equilibrium fails to exist, prices are by denition stochastic, and the
outcome cannot be e¢ cient.
As we have seen, regulation of call prices is subject to a number prob-
lems including informational burdens, allocative ine¢ ciency and a potentially
destabilizing e¤ect on call prices. Perhaps for this reason, mobile call prices
are mostly left unregulated across Europe. Therefore, it seems fruitful to con-
sider alternative policies for dealing with failures in the markets for electronic
communications. Next, we consider regulation of access prices.
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3.3 Regulation of Access Prices
Cost-based Regulation of Access Prices Since bans on margin squeezes
may induce a oor on call prices rather than a ceiling on access prices, one
may wish to consider policies that serve to reduce access prices. The standard
regulatory solution is direct regulation:
Proposition 4 If the operators are required to set access charges above ter-
mination cost (ai  ct) but below the monopoly squeeze level,(aj < pm co)
no equilibrium exists which sustains monopoly prots.
Regulation of access charges at least partly mitigates the monopolization
problem. However, this policy is even more informationally demanding than
call price regulation. Not only does the regulator need to have an assessment
of marginal transmission costs, she also needs demand information to be able
to infer the monopoly price. Second, even if this information were available,
there is no guarantee that an equilibrium in call prices actually exists. Hence,
access price regulation may destabilize the call price market when networks
are highly substitutable.
Reciprocal Access Prices Above Marginal Termination Cost A pol-
icy which is less informationally demanding than the previous one is:
Proposition 5 If the operators are required to set reciprocal access charges
above termination cost (a1 = a2 = a  ct) there exists an equilibrium, and
every equilibrium is competitive.
Proposition 5 states that call prices will be competed all the way down
to marginal cost, provided the reciprocal access price is not too low.4 At
4The exact distribution of customer bases is not determined. There are three possibil-
ities, namely S1 = 1=2 and p

11 = p

21 = p

12 = p

22 = c, or S

i = 1 and p

ii = c, i = 1; 2; see
the Appendix.
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face value, the informational requirements of the policy appear to be weak.
Reciprocity does not require demand data. Also, one can ensure that the
lower bound is met by setting a generous access price. In reality, the feasible
access price may be bounded above by an arbitrage condition. Suppose that
o¤-net calls are priced at c, but access is priced at a   ct > c. Then, each
operator could open a subscription in the competitors network and make o¤-
net calls to ones own network. The gain from such a call would be a ct, but
the cost would merely be c. Operators might be expected to take advantage
of this arbitrage opportunity, which renders c + ct the upper bound to the
feasible access price. Thus, information about the marginal cost of calls
remains critical.
Since both networks have zero prot for any access price above, but may
earn strictly positive prot from an access price below the marginal cost of
termination (Gans and King, 2001), the networks have no incentive to reveal
their costs. However, it is easy to determine whether the two operators price
access below cost simply by looking at the call prices. With an access price
below the marginal cost of termination, the marginal cost of an o¤-net call
is lower than the marginal cost of an on-net call, which in turn implies that
o¤-net calls are cheaper than on-net calls in equilibrium:
Proposition 6 Assume that the two operators set a reciprocal access price
below the marginal cost of termination (a1 = a2 = a < ct). Then, every
operator with a positive market share has an equilibrium o¤-net price which
is lower than the on-net price (pij < p

ii if S

i > 0).
To eliminate any incentive to soften competition by underpricing access,
the proposition suggests that access price regulation be combined with call
price regulation. We now turn to an analysis of a combined regulation.
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3.4 Combined Call Price and Access Price Regulation
As we have demonstrated above, call price or access price regulation alone
seem incapable of achieving the competitive outcome. However, a combina-
tion of call price and access charge regulation is more promising.
Proposition 7 Assume that call price discrimination is prohibited (pii =
pij = pi) and that operators are forced to charge reciprocal access prices
(a1 = a2 = a). For every access price a   co, the competitive outcome
(p1 = p

2 = c) is the unique equilibrium.
A special case of the above is the much debated Bill-and-Keep regime
(a1 = a2 = 0), which in combination with a ban on call-price discrimination
would induce the competitive outcome with interconnected networks.
This policy requires neither demand nor cost data, when the networks
are perfect substitutes as assumed here.
However, there is an additional problem. The result is derived under the
implicit assumption that operators are interconnected. Without an intercon-
nection agreement, there would be two incompatible networks in the market.
Under perfect network substitutability there would be two stable equilibria,
each leading to monopolization by one of the networks. The network exter-
nalities are so strong that both equilibria coexist for any price conguration
satisfying p11 < u
 1(0) and p22 > u
 1(0).5 In particular, monopoly call prices
can be sustained in equilibrium. If the alternative is to sign an agreement
and earn zero prots, it may be in both operators best interest not to sign
any interconnection agreement. Thus, regulatory intervention into the retail
and access markets may have to be assisted by mandatory interconnection.
5Si(p
) = 1 is a stable customer base for any price conguration p where pii < u
 1(0)
and the two networks are disconnected. If a subscriber to network i expects a fraction sj
to choose network j. Then, the benet sju(pjj) of subscribing to network j is lower than
the benet (1  sj)u(pii) of subscribing to network i for sj su¢ ciently low, but positive.
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4 Concluding Remarks
The Monopolization Problem A laissez-faire approach to network com-
petition may lead to monopoly call prices, even if all di¤erentiation between
networks would be removed. A network can sustain its monopoly power
by using its access price to raise the rivals costs for terminating calls inside
the own network while simultaneously setting predatory prices on calls termi-
nated in the rivals network. Thus, there is a scope for regulatory intervention
even in a market where network di¤erentiation is low.
The crucial condition for monopolization is the possibility of setting asym-
metric access prices. In other respects the result is robust.
Absence of di¤erentiation is not crucial for the result. Monopoly call
prices can be sustained in equilibrium even in a standard Hotelling model
of network di¤erentiation such as the one considered by LRT, provided net-
works are not too di¤erentiated. This is shown in the proof of Proposition
1. In LRT, all equilibria break down when networks are su¢ ciently close
substitutes, but this is because the networks are assumed to charge recipro-
cal access prices. There is no reason to presume that two networks would
agree on symmetric access prices if the market could be monopolized under
asymmetric access prices.
Absence of xed costs is not crucial for the result. On the contrary. The
higher are the investment costs, the less would one network have to squeeze
the competitor(s) to preserve monopoly power.
Duopoly is not crucial for the result. Any number of competitors are
blocked from gaining market power if they all accept same unfavorable call
termination conditions.
Absence of two-part tari¤s is not crucial either. With two-part tari¤s
there are no welfare losses due to distortions since the monopolist prices
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calls at marginal cost. Instead, the subscription fee is used to transfer all
surplus from consumers to the monopolist. Still, intervention is warranted if
the social planner values consumer surplus higher than network prot. The
calculations are available on request.
A Regulatory Solution A combination of informationally undemand-
ing policies are shown su¢ cient to restore competition under perfect net-
work substitutability: (i) interconnection is mandatory; (ii) access prices
are reciprocal; (iii) price discrimination between calls inside ones network
(on-net calls) and calls to competing networks (o¤-net calls) is illegal.
Moreover, all three ingredients are necessary to generate a competitive en-
vironment. Unless interconnection is mandatory, the rms can create strong
network externalities and thereby sustain monopoly on-net prices by making
networks incompatible. With disconnected networks, access prices and o¤-
net call prices do not matter for competition. If networks are allowed to di¤er-
entiate their access prices, the network with the lowest access price is driven
out of the market when networks are interconnected and call price discrimi-
nation prohibited. Thus, competition is non-viable. Finally, if the networks
are interconnected and access prices are reciprocal, but call price discrimina-
tion is legal, the networks can soften competition by creating tari¤-mediated
network externalities through a manipulation of the joint access price (see,
e.g. Gans and King, 2001; Armstrong and Wright, 2008; Gabrielsen and
Vagstad, 2008).
Also the regulatory solution is robust in many dimensions. In a compan-
ion paper (Stennek and Tangerås, 2008) we analyze how the above menu of
policies fare when networks are imperfect substitutes and there are more than
two networks. If the regulator places an additional cap on all access prices -
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we call this package STR (structural) regulation - call prices will converge to
marginal cost as network di¤erentiation goes to zero. Also, we nd that a cap
on access prices is necessary even when there are many networks and access
prices are set in bilateral negotiations. Market concentration (the number of
networks) has two countervailing e¤ects on competition. The price elasticity
of subscription demand increases when there are more networks. This com-
petition e¤ect pulls in favour of lower prices. However, a larger fraction of
each networks calls are terminated o¤-net when there are more networks. If
o¤-net calls are subjected to an access price mark-up, the e¤ective marginal
call cost goes up. In a fully covered, symmetric market where the call pattern
is balanced, the cost e¤ect fully neutralizes the competition e¤ect, leaving
equilibrium prices unchanged. Hence, reduced market concentration is no
guarantee of low prices.
In the presence of xed costs, perfect competition is not necessarily the
social optimum. Instead, the networks must be allowed enough market power
to be able to recover their costs. Jeon and Hurkens (2008) show that an
access price rule given by ai  co = 2(pi  c) would implement Ramsey prices
when the networks have a xed cost for each subscription. However, under
this rule the problem still remains how the networks should cover costs that
are independent of the amount of calls and of the number of subscribers.
The STR (structural) regulation allows networks an operating prot which
is declining as networks become closer substitutes. Consequently, there is an
optimal degree of network substitutability under STR (structural) regulation
at which the networks just break even. Optimal network di¤erentiation is an
interesting issue for future research.
Another possibility would be an auction, awarding licenses to the net-
works asking for the smallest subsidy for taking the costs of providing call
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services under the STR regulation.
The competitive result obtained for the menu of regulatory policies (i)-
(iii) under perfect network substitutability extends to the case with two-part
tari¤s (available upon request). Any equilibrium would entail call prices
equal to marginal cost and a subscription fee equal to the xed subscription
cost. However, the policy is demanding because the equilibrium exists if and
only if the access price is equal to the marginal cost of termination. The
networks themselves may prefer an access price di¤erent from the marginal
termination cost thereby inducing stochastic call prices.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We do the proof case by case. First, assume that u (pjj)  u (pij) and that
u (pii)  u (pji), with at least one strict inequality. Note that
V (pi; si)  V (pj; sj) = si(u (pii)  u (pji)) + sj(u (pij)  u (pjj))
is strictly positive for all si 2 (0; 1). Thus, Si 2 f0; 1g. Si = 1 is an
equilibrium since V (pi; 1) V (pj; 0) = u (pii)  u (pji)  0. It is stable since
V (pi; si) > V (pj; sj) for all si < 1. Si = 0 is an equilibrium if and only if
u (pij) = u (pjj) since V (pi; 0)  V (pj; 1) = u (pij)  u (pjj)  0. The Si = 0
equilibrium is unstable since V (pi; si) > V (pj; sj) for all si > 0.
Second, assume that u (pjj) = u (pij) and u (pii) = u (pji). Then V (pi; si) =
V (pj; sj) independently of the customer base si. In this case the operators
by assumption divide the market, i.e. Si = 1=2.
Third, assume that u (pji)  u (pii) and u (pjj)  u (pij), with at least
one strict inequality. V (pj; sj) > V (pi; si) for all si 2 (0; 1) implies that
Si 2 f0; 1g. Si = 0 is a stable equilibrium since V (pi; 0) V (pj; 1) = u (pij) 
u (pjj)  0, and V (pj; sj) > V (pi; si) for all si > 0. Si = 1 is an equilibrium
if and only if u (pii) = u (pji) since V (pi; 1)  V (pj; 0) = u (pii)  u (pji)  0.
The Si = 1 equilibrium is unstable since V (pj; sj) > V (pi; si) for all si < 1.
Fourth, consider the case with positive network externalities, u (pii) >
u (pji) and u (pjj) > u (pij). Si = 1 is an equilibrium because V (pi; 1)  
V (pj; 0) = u (pii)   u (pji) > 0, Si = 0 is an equilibrium because V (pi; 0)  
V (pj; 1) = u (pij) u (pjj) < 0. The Si = 1 equilibrium and Si = 0 equilibria
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are both stable because V (pi; si) > V (pj; sj) even for positive, but small
sj and V (pi; si) < V (pj; sj) even for positive, but small si. There exists a
unique interior equilibrium given by bSi = u(pjj) u(pij)u(p11)+u(p22) u(p12) u(p21) , but this
equilibrium is unstable since
V (pi; bSi + ")  V (pj; bSj   ") = "(u (p11) + u (p22)  u (p12)  u (p21))
is strictly positive (negative) for all " > (<) 0 and the equilibrium thus
converges to one of the corner equilibria Si 2 f0; 1g for every tremble " 6= 0.
Finally, consider the case with negative network externalities. There can
be no corner equilibrium since V (pi; 1)  V (pj; 0) = u (pii)  u (pji) < 0 and
V (pi; 0)   V (pj; 1) = u (pij)   u (pjj) > 0. The only possibility left is the
interior equilibrium given by the solution to V (pi; Si) = V (pj; Sj):
Si =
u (pij)  u (pjj)
u (pij) + u (pji)  u (pii)  u (pjj) .
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume throughout the proof that there are positive network externalities
in equilibrium; u (p11) > u (p

21) and u (p

22) > u (p

12). Let i 2 (0; 1) be the
subjective probability operator i assigns to cornering the market. First, it
cannot be the case that pii < c. In this case it would be strictly protable for
i to deviate to pii = pji and pij > p

jj. The deviation would render i a unique
market share Si = 0 and, consequently, i = 0 > i(p

ii   c)D(pii) = i .
Second, it cannot be the case that pii  c and pii 6= pm. It would then be
strictly protable for i to deviate to pii 2 (pii;minfpm; pjig) and pij = pjj in
case pii 2 [c; pm) and to pii 2 (pm; pii) and pij = pjj in case pii > pm. In both
cases would i corner the market with certainty and earn i = (pii c)D(pii) >
(pii c)D(pii)  i . Finally, it cannot be the case that pii = pm and pij > pjj.
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It would be strictly protable for i to deviate to pij = pjj, corner the market
with certainty and earn i = (pm   c)D(pm) > i(pm   c)D(pm) = i .
Proof of Proposition 1
We rst prove existence, and then move on to showing that all possible
equilibria imply monopolization by operator i.
Existence Proposition 1, stating that laissez-faire leads to monopolization
for very asymmetric access prices is a key result and the rationale for in-
tervention in the market. To demonstrate that the result does not hinge
crucially upon the assumption of perfect network substitutability, we shall
prove the monopolization result in a standard Hotelling model of imperfect
network competition based on the seminal work by La¤ont, Rey and Tirole
(1998a and b).
Assume that a continuum of consumers are uniformly distributed on the
unit interval, and two networks are located at either end of the interval,
operator 1 at 0 and operator 2 at 1. The (virtual) transportation cost t  0
is a measure of horizontal di¤erentiation, with perfect substitutability at
t = 0. The utility of subscribing to network i for a consumer located at a
distance ki from operator i is
+ V (pi; si)  kit+ I = + siu (pii) + (1  si)u (pij)  kit+ I,
where  is the direct utility of subscribing to a network and su¢ ciently
large to guarantee that the market is fully covered. In interior equilibrium,
V (pi; Si) Sit = V (pj; Sj) Sjt, which yields at most one interior customer
base, given by
Sj(p; t) =
t+ u (pji)  u (pii)
2t+ u(pij) + u (pji)  u (pii)  u (pjj) . (3)
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The interior equilibrium is stable if and only if u(p12) + u (p21)  u (p11) +
u (p22) because
V (pi; Si + ") Sit V (pj; Sj ")+Sjt = "(u (p11)+u (p22) u (p12) u (p21)),
and any tremble " > (<) 0 pulls all subscribers towards operator i (j) if
u(p12) + u (p21) < u (p11) + u (p22). We restrict attention to the set of stable
customer bases.
The proof that monopolization is an equilibrium is a special case (t = 0)
of the following more general result:
Proposition 8 Let the customer bases be formed on the basis of the Hotelling
model above. Assume that the networks are not too di¤erentiated, i.e. t <
u(pm). Let ai = ct and aj  u 1(u (pm)  t)  co. Then, the following price
conguration constitutes an equilibrium: pii = p
m, pij = 0, p

jj > u
 1(u(0) t)
and pji = aj+co. The customer base is unique and stable and given by S

i = 1.
Proof. We rst show that it is a strictly dominating strategy for almost all
subscribers to choose network i given p. The net benet
V (pi ; si)  kit  V (pj ; sj) + (1  ki)t
> V (pi ; si)  V (pj ; sj)  t
= si(u (p
m)  u(aj + co)  t) + sj(u(0)  u(pjj)  t)
of choosing operator i over j for a consumer located at ki 2 [0; 1) is strictly
positive no matter the expectation si about is market share. The strict
inequality follows from aj + co  u 1(u (pm)  t) and pjj > u 1(u(0)  t).
Next, we show that operator i has no incentive for deviating. Si = 1 and
pii = p
m imply i = 
m. Substitute aj = pji   co and ai = ct into the prot
function i(pi) to get
i(pi) = Si[Si (pii   c)D (pii) + Sj (pij   c)D (pij) + Sj(pji   c)D(pji)].
29
All deviations are unprotable since for all pi:
i   i(pi) = S2i (m   (pii   c)D (pii)) + SiSj(m   (pij   c)D (pij))
+ SiSj(
m   (pji   c)D(pji)) + S2j m  0,
since pm is the maximand of (p  c)D (p).
We nally show that j cannot prot from gaining a positive market share,
Sj > 0. First, consider the possibility of deviating to a stable interior equilib-
rium, Sj(pj; pi ; t) 2 (0; 1) given by (3). By necessity, pji < u 1(u (pm)  t) 
aj + co, because pji  u 1(u (pm)   t) implies u(pji)  u (pm)   t and thus
Sj(pj; p

i ; t) = 0 since the denominator of (3) is positive in any stable equilib-
rium. Since pji < aj + co, by necessity (pjj   c)D(pjj) > 0 because otherwise
operator js prot
j(pj) = Sj [Sj (pjj   c)D (pjj) + Si (pji   aj   co)D(pji)]
would be non-positive. Sj(pj; pi ; t) implicitly denes pji(pjj) as a function of
pjj. Any movements of pji and pjj along the iso-market share curve
u (pji) =
Sj   Si
Si
t+ u (pii) +
Sj
Si
(u(pij)  u (pjj)), (4)
keep the market share of operator j constant. The slope of the iso-market
share curve is
dpji
dpjj
=  Sj
Si
D(pjj)
D(pji)
(5)
since u0 =  D. Dene prot ej(pjj) = j(pjj; pji(pjj)). Along the iso-market
curve, prots are a¤ected as follows:
@ej=@pjj = S2j (D (pjj) + (pjj   c)D0 (pjj))
+ SiSj (D(pji) + (pji   aj   co)D0(pji)) dpjidpjj
= S2jD (pjj)

1  (pjj c)
pjj
(pjj)

  SiSjD(pji)

1  (pji aj co)
pji
(pji)

SjD(pjj)
SiD(pji)
= S2jD (pjj)
h
(pji aj co)
pji
(pji)  (pjj c)pjj (pjj)
i
.
(6)
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Marginal prot is strictly negative for all pjj > c and pji < aj + co. Thus
ej(pjj) < lim
pjj!c
ej(pjj) = SiSj (pji(c)  aj   co)D (pji(c)) < 0,
and so a deviation by j to a stable equilibrium with Sj(pj; pi ; t) 2 (0; 1)
is unprotable since j = 0. The nal possibility is a deviation by j to
monopoly. Note that Sj(pj; pi ; t) = 1 only if V (pj; 1)   t  V (pi ; 0), which
is equivalent to u(pjj)  u(0)+ t. This is possible only if pjj = 0. But Sj = 1
and pjj = 0 imply j =  cD(0) < 0 = j , and a deviation to monopoly is
not protable, either.
Monopolization The proof that all possible equilibria imply monopoliza-
tion by operator i, given the chosen access prices and given perfect network
substitutability is collected in a series of seven claims. Claims 1 to 4 estab-
lish that Si = 1 in every equilibrium. Claim 5 shows that p

ij  c in every
equilibrium with Si = 1. Claims 6 and 7 demonstrate that p

ii = p
m in every
equilibrium with Si = 1.
Claim 1 If pji > p
m, then Si = 1.
Proof. For pji > p
m, i can ensure itself monopoly status and prot m by
setting pii = pm < pji and pij  pjj. Thus, i  m. Moreover, i  m
since j  0, and i + j  m. Now, i = m only if Si > 0. To see that
pji > p
m implies Si = 1, observe that industry prot
1 + 

2 = (S

1)
2 (p11   c)D(p11) + (S2)2 (p22   c)D(p22)
+S1S

2((p

12   c)D (p12) + (p21   c)D (p21)) < m
for all Si 2 (0; 1) and pji > pm. This is inconsistent with i = m and
j = 0.
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Claim 2 Assume that aj  pm   co and ai  ct. Then, pji  pm and
(pjj   c)D(pjj) > 0 imply Si 2 f0; 1g.
Proof. There cannot exist any equilibrium with (pjj   c)D(pjj) > 0 and
Sj 2 (0; 1). For Sj 2 (0; 1) to be an equilibrium, it must necessarily be the
case that, p21 < p

11 and p

22 > p

12, see Lemma 1. @ej(pjj)=@pjj < 0 for every
(pjj c)D(pjj) > 0 and pji  pm  aj+co imply that the proposed equilibrium
conguration does not maximize prot. Consequently, Si 2 f0; 1g.
Claim 3 Assume that aj  pm   co and ai  ct. Then, pji  pm and
(pjj   c)D(pjj)  0 imply Si 2 f0; 1g.
Proof. Neither (pjj   c)D(pjj)  0, pji  pm  aj + co and Sj > 0 nor
(pjj c)D(pjj) = 0, pji < pm  aj+co and Sj 2 (0; 1) nor (pjj c)D(pjj) = 0,
pji  pm < aj + co and Sj 2 (0; 1) can be equilibria because all cases would
imply j < 0:
j  Sj [Sj (pjj   c)D(pjj) + Si (pji   aj   co)D(pji)] < 0. (7)
To complete the proof, we need to rule out the possibility that (pjj c)D(pjj) =
0, pji = p
m = aj + co and Sj 2 (0; 1). In this case i can set pii = pm, pij < c
corner the market and earn m. It cannot earn as much by letting j into the
market since pjj 6= pm, hence i + i < m and consequently i < m.
Claim 4 Assume that aj  pm   co and ai  ct. Then, pji  pm implies
Si > 0.
Proof. Obviously, Sj = 1 can be an equilibrium only if p

jj  c, otherwise j
would run a decit in equilibrium. Moreover, pji  c in any equilibrium Sj =
1. Otherwise, i can set pii 2 (c; pji) and pij < pjj, become the monopolist
and earn prot (pii   c)D(pii) > 0, which is strictly preferred to having zero
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market share. Finally, Si = 1 implies p

ii  pm. If pii > pm, i could lower
pii to pm, retain monopoly power and obtain the higher monopoly rent m.
Hence, pji  c  pjj  pm in any equilibrium with Sj = 1. Consider is
policy pii > c  pji and pij < pjj. In this case Si 2 (0; 1). Moreover,
@i
@pij
jpii>c;pij=pjj =
@Si
@pij

(pjj   ai   co)D(pjj) + (aj   ct)D(pji)

< 0,
since u(pii) < u(pji) and u(pij) = u(p

jj) imply Si = 0, and @Si=@pijjpii>c;pij=pjj
=  D(pjj)=(u(pji)  u(pii)) < 0. Thus, it is strictly protable for i to lower
pij slightly below pjj and gain a positive market share.
Claim 5 Si = 1 implies p

ij  c.
Proof. First, of all Si = 1 implies p

ii  c. Otherwise i would run a strict loss.
Any combination pii  c and pij > c allows j to charge a price pjj 2 (c; pij)
and pji < pii, become the monopolist and earn prot j = (pjj c)D(pjj) > 0.
This, of course, is better than having no market share at all.
Claim 6 Si = 1 implies p

ii  pm.
Proof. If pii > p
m, i could lower pii to pm, retain monopoly power and
obtain the higher monopoly rent m.
Claim 7 Assume that aj  a = ct+2 (pm   c)+cD (0) =D (pm) and ai  ct.
Then, Si = 1 implies p

ii  pm.
Proof. The proof amounts to showing that ai  ct, aj  a and Si = 1
jointly imply pji  pm. Any equilibrium with Si = 1, pji  pm and pii < pm
is impossible, because i then could increase prots to the monopoly rent by
increasing pii slightly, but keeping it below pm, while maintaining pij  pjj,
and thus monopoly status.
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Next, ai  ct, aj  a and Si = 1 jointly imply pji  pm: Any equilibrium
with Si = 1 and p

ji < p
m necessarily has pii  pji. To see this, note that
i cannot gain anything by setting pii < pji < p
m because any price increase
towards pji would still render i the monopoly power and thus increase prots
per outgoing call. Note also that i would cease to be a certain monopolist
should pii > pji, see Lemma 1. So S

i = 1 and p

ji < p
m imply i = (p

ji  
c)D(pji). Consider is incentive for setting a price pii 2 (pji; pm), while
holding u(pij) > u(p

jj) which would imply a market share Si 2 (0; 1):
limpii#pji
@i
@pii
jpii>pji;pij<pjj = D(pji)(1 
(pji c)
pji
(pji))
+
D(pji)
u(pij) u(pjj)

(pij   ai   co)D(pij) + (aj   ct   2(pji   c))D(pji)

The rst term in square brackets is strictly positive for all pji < p
m. The
second term in square brackets is positive for all aj  a and pji < pm. Hence,
i has an incentive to increase its price and sacrice its monopoly market share
given ai  ct, aj  a, and pji < pm.
Proof of Proposition 2
We know from Claims 1 to 4 in the proof of Proposition 1 that for ai = ct and
aj  pm co, all pure strategy equilibria have Si = 1. Moreover, pii  pm; see
Claim 6. Consider the following set of call prices, c  pii = pji  pm, pij = 0
and pjj =  2 (0; pji). In this case Si = 1. We further know, see the proof of
Proposition 8, that j cannot strictly prot by gaining positive market share
as long as ai  ct, aj  pm   co, pij  c and pii  pm. Considering next is
incentive to deviate, the rst thing to observe is that i has no incentive to
lower pii below pji as there is nothing to gain in terms of market share, but
the price is lowered even further below pm. If i increases pii above pji, it is
necessary to keep pij < pjj, otherwise i loses its entire market share to j. At
pii > p

ji  c and pij < pjj < pji = pii, Si 2 (0; 1). Fix the market share
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Si and consider a move along the iso-market line, see (6). Along this line,
prots are a¤ected as follows
e0i(pii) = S2iD (pii) (pij   c)pij (pij)  (pii   c)pii (pii)

 0.
The inequality follows from the fact that pii > c, pij < pii, and (p  c) (p)=p
is increasing in p. Hence, for any (pii; pij) such that Si 2 (0; 1), we have
i  S2i (pji   c)D(pji) + SiSj(pjj   c)D(pjj) + SiSj(aj   ct)D(pji)
since pij ! pjj as pii ! pji along the iso-market line. At the proposed
monopoly i = (p

ji   c)D(pji), hence
i i  Sj

(1 + Si)(p

ji   c)D(pji)  Si(pjj   c)D(pjj)  Si(aj   ct)D(pji)

.
The term in square brackets is decreasing in aj, and since aj < a,
i   i  Sj
 
(1 + Si)(p

ji   c)D(pji)  Si(pjj   c)D(pjj)

 SiSj(2(pm   c) + c D(0)
D(pm)
)D(pji)
If pji ! pm and pjj ! 0, the term on the right hand side of the inequality
converges to S2j (p
m  c)D(pm) > 0. Hence, there exists a pji su¢ ciently close
to and below pm and a pjj su¢ ciently close to, but above zero such that i
prefers to hold on to his monopoly power at pii = p

ji < p
m.
Proof of Proposition 3
We rst demonstrate that p1 = p

2 = p
. There can be no equilibrium in
which pi > p

j > c [p

i > p

j = c]. In equilibrium, S

i = 0 and 

i = 0
[j = 0], hence i [j] could strictly increase prots by cutting [raising] prices
to pi 2 (c; pj) [pj 2 (c; pi )]. There is no equilibrium in which pi > pj and
pj < c since then S

j = 1 and 

j < 0.
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We next demonstrate that p = c. There can be no equilibrium with
p < c since this would imply negative industry prots, hence at least one
rm running at a loss. Finally, there can be no equilibrium with p > c,
either. Industry prots would then be equal to (p   c)D(p), hence at least
one rm would have prots strictly below (p   c)D(p). This rm could
deviate and steal the entire market by lowering prices below p. The only
equilibrium candidate left is p1 = p

2 = c.
Proof of Proposition 4
For the industry to reach the monopoly prot, either one operator has the
monopoly (Si = 1) and charges the monopoly price on on-net calls (pii = p
m),
or both operators have a positive market share (Si 2 (0; 1)) and charge the
monopoly price on all products (p11 = p

12 = p

21 = p

22 = p
m). In the last
case, the operators divide the market and obtain half the monopoly prot
each (1 = 2 = m=2). This cannot be an equilibrium. By lowering the
o¤-net price below the monopoly price (pij 2 (0; pm)), any single operator
can corner the market and reap the entire monopoly rent. Assume therefore
that pii = p
m and Si = 1. Consider js alternative policy pji 2 (aj + co; pm)
and pjj > c  pij. In this case Sj 2 (0; 1) and
j = S
2
j (pjj   c)D(pjj) + SiSj[(pji   aj   co)D(pji) + (ai   ct)D(pij)] > 0.
Thus pii = p
m and Si = 1 cannot be an equilibrium, either.
Proof of Proposition 5
The rst claim proves the existence of a competitive equilibrium under the
assumption that a1 = a2  ct.
Claim 8 Assume that a1 = a2  ct. Then, p11 = p21 = p12 = p22 = c is an
equilibrium.
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Proof. At the proposed equilibrium, i = 0. Neither a deviation to pii < c
nor to pii = c and pij 6= c can be protable. In both cases Si 2 f0; 1g. As
i = 0 when Si = 0 and i = (pii   c)D(pii)  0 when Si = 1, the deviation
cannot be strictly protable. Any protable deviation must therefore be to
pii > c. In this case it cannot be strictly protable to also set pij  c, because
then Si = 0 and i = 0. We nally need to check the protability of the
deviation pii > c > pij. In this case Si 2 (0; 1) due to the negative network
externalities. Consider the marginal e¤ect on prot of a movement among
the iso-market-share curve pij (pii), see (4):
e0i (pii) = S2iD (pii) pij   c  (ai   ct)pij  (pij)  (pii   c)pii  (pii)

 0
because pij < c, pii > c and ai  ct. Note that limpii!c pij (pii) = c, and so
i (pii) < lim i (pii)pii!c = SiSj (aj   ai)D (c) = 0
by reciprocity of the access price. Any deviation pii > c > pij is unprotable,
which completes the proof.
The nal sequence of claims is used to prove that all possible equilibria
are e¢ cient. We invoke Lemma 2 and rule out equilibria with positive net-
work externalities. Claim 9 demonstrates that under reciprocal access prices
a1 = a2 = a  ct, all equilibria in which one operator corners the market
necessarily are e¢ cient. Claim 10 proves that there is at most one equilib-
rium in which the two operators divide the market equally under reciprocal
access prices a1 = a2 = a  ct. This equilibrium is e¢ cient. Finally, we
show that there is no equilibrium with negative network externalities and
reciprocal access prices a1 = a2 = a  ct.
Claim 9 Let a1 = a2 = a  ct. Then, Si = 1 implies pii = c  pij.
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Proof. Note rst that Si = 1 implies p

ii  c  pij. Obviously, pii  c since
pii < c and S

i = 1 imply 

i < 0. S

i = 1 and p

ij > c cannot simultaneously
hold because j could then enter as a monopolist and earn a strictly positive
prot by setting pjj 2 (c; pij) and pji  pii. Suppose therefore that Si = 1,
pii > c and p

ij  c. In this case operator j could enter at (pjj   c)D(pjj) > 0
and pji 2 (c; pii), induce negative network externalities, get a market share
Sj 2 (0; 1) and prot
j = Sj

Sj (pjj   c)D (pjj) + Si(pji   c)D (pji) + Si (a  ct) (D(pij) D (pji))

,
which is strictly positive since pjj > c, pji > c, a  ct and D(pij)  D(c) >
D (pji). Thus, Si = 1 implies p

ii = c  pij if a1 = a2 = a  ct.
Claim 10 If u(p11) = u(p

21) = u(p

1) and u(p

12) = u(p

22) = u(p

2), then
p1 = p

2 = c.
Proof. We rst show that p1 = p

2 = p
. Industry prot is
1 + 

2 =
1
2
((p1   c)D (p1) + (p2   c)D(p2)).
It cannot be the case that (p1   c)D (p1)  0 and (p2   c)D (p2)  0 with
one inequality strict, because industry prot would then be negative. Either
(p1 c)D (p1) = (p2 c)D (p2) p2 = 0, (p1 c)D (p1) > 0 or (p2 c)D (p2) > 0.
Suppose rst that (pi   c)D (pi ) > (pj   c)D(pj), and (pi   c)D (pi ) > 0.
In this case operator i could corner the market by lowering its on-net price
slightly from pi and earn a prot i  (pi   c)D (pi ) > 1 + 2  i .
Suppose next that (p1 c)D (p1) = (p2 c)D(p2). Either p1 = p2, and we are
done, or pi > p
m > pj , in which case i could lower its on-net price towards
the monopoly price and earn i > (pi   c)D (pi ) = 1 + 2  i . Hence,
p1 = p

2 = p
.
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When both operators charge p, i =
1
4
[2(p   c) + aj   ai]D (p), with
p  c. If p > c, at least the operator with an unfavourable access price
ai  aj has an incentive to corner the market by reducing its price on o¤-net
calls below p, thus earning i = D (p) (p   c) > i .
Finally, there can be no equilibrium with negative network externalities.
Claim 11 Assume that a2  ct and a1  ct. Any equilibrium with negative
network externalities then satises p11 > c, p

22 > c, p

12 > a1 + co, p

21 >
a2 + co.
Proof. Note rst that it cannot be the case that both p11  c and p22 
c. Since p21 < p

11 and p

12 < p

22 by the assumption of negative network
externalities, industry prot
1 + 

2 = (S

1)
2 (p11   c)D(p11) + (S2)2 (p22   c)D(p22)
+S1S

2((p

12   c)D (p12) + (p21   c)D (p21))
then would be negative, and so at least one operator would run at a strict
loss. Assume wlog that pii > c. Dene implicitly pij(pii) by means of the
iso-market share relation (4) where Si = Si , and let ei(pij) = i(pii(pij); pij).
Marginal prot
e0i(pij) = Si SjD(pij)[pii   cpii (pii)  (p

ij   ai   co)
pij
(pij)]
is strictly positive for all pij  ai + co since pii > c. Thus, pii > c implies
pij > ai + co. But then even p

jj > c, since p

jj > p

ij > ai + co  c. One can
then apply the same reasoning used to prove that pii > c implies p

ij > ai+co,
to show that pjj > c implies p

ji > aj + co.
From the above claim we observe that equilibrium prices are strictly pos-
itive. Thus, the rst-order condition e0i(pij) = 0 must be satised, which
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implies the Ramsey relation
pii   c
pii
(pii) =
(pij   ai   co)
pij
(pij).
Subtract
pij c
pij
(pij) from both sides of the Ramsey relation and rearrange:
pii   c
pii
(pii) 
pij   c
pij
(pij) =  
(ai   ct)
pij
(pij).
The right-hand side is non-positive, and since (p   c)(p)=p is increasing
in p > c, it must be the case that pij  pii in every interior equilibrium
with ai  ct. Thus p12  p11 and p21  p22. Combine this with p21 < p11
and p12 < p

22 from the assumption of negative network externalities to get
p12  p11 > p21  p22 > p12, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is done by going through the possible equilibrium customer bases
case by case, see Lemma 1 for a description of the possible congurations.
Also, we invoke Lemma 2 and rule out equilibria with positive network exter-
nalities. The rst Claim proves that monopoly implies an on-net price below
the o¤-net price if a1 = a2 = a < ct.
Claim 12 If a1 = a2 = a < ct, then Si = 1 implies p

ii > p

ij.
Proof. Note rst that Si = 1 implies p

ii  c  pij. Obviously, pii  c since
pii < c and S

i = 1 imply 

i < 0. S

i = 1 and p

ij > c cannot simultaneously
hold because j could then corner the market and earn a strictly positive
prot by setting pjj 2 (c; pij) and pji  pii. We nally show that Si = 1
and pii = p

ij = c cannot possibly hold. Assume that operator j in that case
enters at u(pji) = 2u(c)   u(pjj), which implicitly denes pji(pjj) from the
iso-market share relation (4). Operator j gets half the customers and earns
4ej(pjj) = (pjj   c)D (pjj) + (pji(pjj)  a  co)D (pji(pjj)) + (a  ct)D (c)
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Now,
4e0j(pjj) = D (pjj)(pji(pjj)  a  co)pji(pjj)  (pji(pjj))  (pjj   c)pjj  (pjj)

and so 4e0j(c) = D (c)  (c) (ct   a)=c > 0. Consequently, ej(pjj) > ej(c) = 0
for some pjj slightly above c and pji(pjj) slightly below c. Network j can
protably enter at pii = p

ij = c if a < ct. Hence, S

i = 1 cannot hold.
Consider next the case in which both operators have a positive market
share, either they split the market, u(p11) = u(p

21) and u(p

12) = u (p

22), or
there are negative network externalities, u(p11) < u(p

21) and u(p

12) > u (p

22).
We rst show that pii  c. Suppose on the contrary that pii < c. By necessity,
pij > a+ co since otherwise 

i < 0. Recall the iso-market share relation
u(pij) = u(p

jj) +
Si
Sj
(u(pji)  u(pii))
which implicitly denes pij(pii), with p0ij(pii) =  S

i
Sj
D(pii)
D(pij(pii))
and pij(pii) =
pij. Let ei(pii) = ei(pii; pij(pii)). The marginal prot
e0i(pii) = (Si )2D (pii) (pij   a  co)pij (pij)  (p

ii   c)
pii
 (pii)

is strictly positive for all pii < c and p

ij > a + co, and so for all p

ii < c
network i strictly prots from an increase in the on-net price above pii. Note
that pij < p

ii for all p

ij < c since p

ii  c. Consider therefore the case with
pii  c and pij  c > a+ co. In interior equilibrium, e0i(pii) = 0, which from
above implies the equilibrium Ramsey relation
pii   c
pii
 (pii) =
pij   a  co
pij
(pij).
Subtract
pij c
pij
(pij) from both sides and simplify to
pii   c
pii
 (pii) 
pij   c
pij
(pij) =
ct   a
pij
(pij) > 0.
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The strict inequality follows from a < ct and u(pij) > u(p

jj)  0 which in
turn implies D(pij) > 0. By assumption,
p c
p
 (p) is non-decreasing in p for
all p  c. Hence pii c
pii
 (pii) 
pij c
pp
ij
(pij) for all p

ij  pii  c, and it must
necessarily be the case that pij < p

ii.
Proof of Proposition 7
From the Proof of Proposition 3 we know that the only possible equilibrium
when each operator is forced to charge a uniform price on all its products,
is p1 = p

2 = c. Under reciprocal access prices, 

1 = 

2 = 0. No operator
has an incentive to increase its price as this would only lead to a complete
eradication of market share. No operator would lower its price as it would
become a monopolist pricing below marginal cost.
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